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 NATURALNESS OF 
PROPERTIES AND SIMPLICITY 
OF THEORIES
Abstract: In this paper, I  discuss 
a specifi c approach to measuring and 
comparing the simplicity of theories
that is based on Lewis’s notion of 
fundamental properties. In particu-
lar, I discuss the criterion of simplic-
ity as stated by Williams. According 
to Williams, the best candidate for 
a  theory is the one which has the
shortest defi nition in terms of funda-
mental properties. Th e aim of this pa-
per is to show that the criterion thus
specifi ed has two constraints. First,
the criterion is not applicable to cases
in which candidates for theories that 
specify fundamental properties are
compared. Secondly, the applicabil-
ity of the criterion in social sciences
seems to be unwarranted.
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Přirozenost vlastností 
a jednoduchost teorií
Abstrakt: V  tomto příspěvku se
zabývám specifi ckým přístupem 
k měření a porovnání jednoduchosti 
teorií, který je založen na  Lewisově 
pojetí fundamentálních vlastností. 
Zejména se zabývám kritériem 
jednoduchosti, jak ho prezentuje 
Williams. Podle Williamse nejlepší 
kandidát na  teorii je ten, který má 
nejkratší defi nici z  hlediska funda-
mentálních vlastností. Cílem tohoto 
příspěvku je ukázat, že takto speci-
fi kované kritérium má dvě omezení. 
Zaprvé, kritérium není použitelné 
v  případech, kdy porovnáváme 
kandidáty na teorie, které stanovují 
fundamentální vlastnosti. Zadruhé, 
aplikace tohoto kritéria v  sociálních 
vědách se zdá být neopodstatněná.
Klíčová slova: přirozenost;
jednoduchost; David Lewis; 
fundamentální vlastnosti
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4Th e idea that simplicity of theories should play some role in the theoretical 
refl ection of scientifi c practice is a part of the philosophy of science since 
its beginning. While basically no one believes that simplicity plays no role 
at all, positive answers are varied. In this paper, I will focus on a  specifi c 
view on simplicity of theories which is based on David Lewis’s1 notion of 
fundamental properties and advocated by Williams.2 Williams believes that
we should understand Lewis’s ranking of properties (based on the notion 
of fundamental properties) as an “instrument” for stating the criterion of 
simplicity of theories. According to Williams, the simplest theory is the one 
with the shortest defi nition when stated in terms of fundamental properties.
While Williams’s proposal settles an interesting line of an interpreta-
tion of Lewis, the suggested connection of two normally independent topics 
– metaphysics of properties and simplicity of theories – may be hard to see. 
A partial aim of this paper is therefore to clarify the connection between 
Lewis’s views on naturalness of properties and simplicity of theories. Th e 
main aim of this paper is to provide a critical reconsideration of the crite-
rion of simplicity, as proposed by Williams, and of its general applicability 
to a comparison of simplicity of any two theories. While I believe that to 
understand simplicity in terms of naturalness may sound reasonable in case 
of some theories, I do not agree that this criterion can be used as a general 
principle for measuring/comparing simplicity of theories. In the fi rst part of 
the paper, I will present Lewis’s view on naturalness of properties, as well as 
its connection to the topic of simplicity of theories as advocated by Williams. 
In the second part of the paper, I will present a critical reconsideration of 
Williams’s criterion of simplicity of theories if used as a generally applicable 
criterion.
1 David Lewis, “New Work for a Th eory of Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61,
no. 4 (1983): 343–77; David Lewis, “Putnam’s Paradox,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62,
no. 3 (1984): 221–36.
2 J. Robert G. Williams, “Eligibility and Inscrutability,” Philosophical Review 116, no. 3 (2007):
361–99; J. Robert G. Williams, “Lewis on Reference and Eligibility,” in A Companion to David 
Lewis, eds. Barry Loewer and Jonathan Schaff er (Oxford: Wiley–Blackwell, 2015), 367–81.
Th is work was supported by Philosophical Faculty, University of Hradec Králové, where the 
author currently holds the position of Junior Researcher. I would like to thank the anonymous 
reviewers for their valuable comments and eff orts towards improving this manuscript.
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5David Lewis on Naturalness
Before I proceed to a critical reconsideration of Williams’s proposal, I try to 
present Lewis’s views on naturalness of properties in detail and to elucidate 
the relation between the naturalness of properties and simplicity of theories.
Lewis introduced the idea of the naturalness of properties in his paper 
“New Work for a Th eory of Universals.”3 Th e most basic motivation behind 
the idea was to fi nd a criterion which would allow us to compare objective 
distinctions and similarities between properties (understood more or less 
as classes of things). Th e idea that there are objective similarities between 
things is intuitively acceptable for philosophers as well as for lay persons. 
Most people would agree that the class consisting of all the occurrences of 
water on Earth is in some way more uniform than the class consisting of all 
animals on Earth. And the class consisting of all animals on Earth is still in 
some way more uniform than the class consisting of water, dogs, aeroplanes 
and revolutions.
Th e philosophically interesting question is on the basis of what we can 
compare classes of such radically dissimilar objects. Th e answer to this ques-
tion leads us to a reconsideration of what all those objects have in common. 
If we talk about such a gerrymandered class, then physical reality seems to 
be a reasonable candidate for a common ground of comparison. What water, 
dogs, aeroplanes, and even revolutions have in common is that they “are part 
of” the same physical world. In fact, if we follow physics, then at the most 
basic level everything in the world consists of the same physical particles –
quarks and electrons.
Lewis decided to follow the idea that the most fundamental parts of the 
world are those proposed by current physics (quarks and electrons) and sub-
sequently that the most fundamental properties in the world are also physi-
cal – mass, charge, and spin. Th is is, to some degree, a consequence of his 
acceptance of the Ultra–sparse theory of universals (or properties as their 
equivalent) and, to some degree, a consequence of his reductive approach to 
properties. Moreover, Lewis proposed to ascribe a specifi c privileged status 
to the properties at the most basic microphysical level. Th e privileged status 
of the fundamental microphysical properties resulted from the fact that 
those properties had a potential to be used to explicate all other properties 
(e.g., macroscopic properties such as being animal or being wooden). In fact, 
Lewis’s strategy is a  version of reductionism of macroscopic properties to 
3 Lewis, “New Work for a Th eory of Universals,” 343–77.
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6microscopic ones. In Lewis’s terminology fundamental microphysical prop-
erties are perfectly natural and all other properties should be explicated in 
terms of those perfectly natural ones.4
Furthermore, Lewis used the idea of fundamental microphysical prop-
erties to state an objective criterion for “ranking” properties. Fundamental 
microphysical properties, such as mass, charge, and spin, are at the bottom 
of the ranking as perfectly natural properties and they serve as a  unit of 
measurement of relative naturalness of other properties. Relative natural-
ness of other properties is ranked on the basis of their “distance” from 
perfectly natural ones. Th e question is how we can measure the distance 
of a property from perfectly natural ones. Lewis proposed to measure the 
distance on the basis of the length of their defi nitions if stated in terms of 
fundamental properties.
Lewis’s writings give us a little clue on how to spell out the idea of defi ni-
tions in fundamental properties, but a good example of how such a defi ni-
tion may look like is provided by Th eodore Sider.5 Sider demonstrates such
defi nition on a simplifi ed defi nition of a hydrogen atom: “ƎxƎy(Ex˄Py˄Rxy), 
which should be read as: ‘Th ere exist an electron and a proton, the fi rst of 
which orbits the second’.”6 Th e idea is that, in one way or another, we should 
be able to state a chain of defi nitions which links the property being defi ned 
to some fundamental properties even for more complex properties (such as 
being an animal).
Th e criterion for ranking properties on the scale from the perfectly natu-
ral ones to very unnatural ones is then rather straightforward: the longer the 
defi nition, the less natural the property. For example, we can stipulate that 
the defi nition of a property being a molecule of water is considerably shorter 
than the defi nition of a property being an animal. To defi ne a molecule of 
water we need only to double the defi nition of a hydrogen atom and to add 
the defi nition of an atom of oxygen, but the defi nition of the property being 
an animal consists of defi nitions (i.e., microphysical descriptions) of all the 
atoms and molecules which form objects that we call animals.
4  See Lewis, “New Work for a Th eory of Universals,” 357–68.
5  Th eodore Sider, Writing the Book of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
6  Sider, Writing the Book, 120. Sider is generally sceptical about eff ective ways of defi ning or-
dinary properties such as being an animal, but he believes that, theoretically, such defi nitions 
could be stated. See Th eodore Sider, “Sparseness, Immanence, and Naturalness,” Noûs  29,
no. 3 (1995): 360–77.
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7Rival Interpretations
While the way how to state defi nitions of properties in terms of fundamental 
properties is basically taken for granted, the role of the ranking of properties 
in Lewis’s broader views in metaphysics and philosophy of science has been 
an object of a  lively debate in the recent years. Most of the commentators 
agree – and Lewis was explicit about it – that one of his aims was to use 
naturalness of properties to answer some of the sceptical challenges in phi-
losophy (e.g., Putnam’s7 model theoretic argument or Goodman’s8 riddle of 
induction).
However, opinions of commentators vary in how exactly the idea of 
naturalness of properties should be used to answer the challenges and how 
it should fi t his broader views on language.9 Weatherson10 and Schwarz11
believe that the criterion for ranking properties is primarily meant to co–
determine mental content and by doing so it helps to determine semantic 
content. On the other hand, Sider12 believes that the criterion is meant to 
be used to directly determine the semantic content of particular predicates 
(taken into account their use). Th e third line of interpretation is advocated 
by Williams, who suggests that the criterion for ranking properties should 
be primarily used for the comparison of (simplicity of) theories and only 
indirectly as a  meaning-determining criterion. Even though it could be 
interesting to compare the viability of particular proposals with regard to 
Lewis’s writings, it is not in the primary scope of this paper to follow exegeti-
cal discussions.
7  Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
8  Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1955).
9  See David Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1969); David Lewis, “Languages and Language,” in Language, Mind, and Knowledge, ed. 
Keith Gunderson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), 3–35.
10  Brian Weatherson, “Th e Role of Naturalness in Lewis’s Th eory of Meaning,” Journal for the 
History of Analytical Philosophy 1, no. 10 (2013): 1–19. However, see a critical reassessment of 
Weatherson’s view: Matej Drobňák, “Epistemological Naturalness: What is a Good Heuristic 
Strategy Good For?,” Logic and Logical Philosophy 27, no. 1 (2018): 85–104.
11  Wolfgang Schwarz, “Against Magnetism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92, no. 1 
(2013): 17–36.
12  Th eodore Sider, “Ontological Realism,” in Metametaphysics, eds. David Chalmers, David 
Manley, and Ryan Wasserman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 384–423; Sider, 
Writing the Book.
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8With regard to the main aim of this paper, I will focus on the interpreta-
tion of Lewis’s views on naturalness as provided by Williams13 and I  will
take it for granted. In any case, I  believe, that the fact whether Williams 
off ers accurate interpretation of Lewis does not have any infl uence on the 
main argument presented in this paper. Th is is mainly because Williams’s 
proposal can be assessed on its own. Regardless of the fact whether Lewis 
would agree with Williams, Williams’s attempt to defi ne the simplicity of 
theories in terms of naturalness of properties can be seen as a cornerstone 
of an interesting and original view on similarity of theories. And it is the 
assessment of a general viability of this view that is in the main focus of this 
paper.
Williams on Naturalness and Simplicity
Th e most controversial and original point of the Williams’s interpretation of 
Lewis is his conviction of the specifi c role naturalness should play in Lewis’s 
views on language. In the line with other commentators, Williams admits 
that the idea of naturalness of properties can be used to determine meaning, 
but this is only its secondary function. As Williams argues, the criterion of 
naturalness is primarily meant to be used as the criterion of simplicity of 
theories and so its primary function should be to determine which of the 
candidate theories is the best one – the best theory is the one which best fi ts 
the data and if there are more theories which fi t the data equally well, then 
the criterion of simplicity should step in.
In his paper, Williams focuses on one particular application of the 
criterion – to determine the best candidate for a semantic theory of some 
language. Th e secondary feature of the use of the criterion is that by de-
termining the best candidate for a semantic theory, we basically determine 
semantic contents of particular expressions as well.
When applied to semantics, the best semantic theory should be the one 
which fi ts the data better than others. If more semantic theories fi t the data 
equally well, then the best semantic theory is the simplest one. Simplicity 
of theories is then explicated by Williams as a matter of naturalness. Th e 
theory which has the shortest defi nition in terms of fundamental properties, 
i.e., which has the lowest syntactic complexity, is the most natural one and so 
the most simple one. Th e question that needs to be answered is how we can 
13 Williams, “Eligibility and Inscrutability,” 361–99; Williams, “Lewis on Reference and 
Eligibility,” 367–81.
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9state and measure the syntactic complexity of semantic theories in terms of 
fundamental properties.
To achieve this, Williams takes into account semantic theories as 
presented in Lewis’s “General Semantics.”14 According to Lewis, semantic 
theories consist mostly of clauses assigning semantic values to particular 
expressions. Williams’s proposal is that, in the ideal case, the syntactic com-
plexity of a semantic theory could be stated by the syntactic complexity of all 
the clauses which it consists of. Since these clauses are mostly clauses which 
assign semantic values to particular expressions, we can in some sense say 
that the syntactic complexity of a  semantic theory is stated by syntactic 
complexities of the assigned semantic values.
To understand the connection between the naturalness of properties 
and syntactic complexity of clauses assigning semantic values, we need to 
notice that, according to Lewis, properties can play a role of semantic values 
for predicates. Th is is a rather unusual position in semantics, but it helps to 
explain how Lewis’s views on properties are interconnected with his views 
in metasemantics. If we accept that properties can play the role of semantic 
values, then the syntactic complexity of semantic values can be stated by the 
defi nitions of properties in terms of fundamental properties.
If this is so, then the simplest semantic theory is the one which has the 
shortest overall defi nition of all the properties that are assigned as semantic 
values to predicates by the clauses of the theory. Generally speaking, the 
criterion of simplicity as proposed by Williams says that the best candidate 
for a  theory is the one with the shortest defi nition, if defi ned in terms of 
fundamental properties.
Simplicity of Th eories
Before I move to a critical reconsideration of Williams’s proposal for a com-
parison of simplicity of theories, one thing needs to be explicitly stated. Th ere 
is no indication in Williams’s writings that he would intend to apply the 
criterion of simplicity beyond the comparison of semantic theories. At the 
same time, however, there is no indication in his writings that his criterion 
of simplicity should be applied to semantic theories only. It makes sense that 
Williams focuses on semantic theories, because he tries to provide an expla-
14 David Lewis, “General Semantics,” Synthese 22, no. 1 (1970): 18–67. For a  general over-
view of semantic theories and their assessment see: Lukáš Bielik, “How to Assess Th eories of 
Meaning? Some Notes on the Methodology of Semantics,” Organon F 19, no. 3 (2012): 325–37.
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nation of how Lewis’s view on naturalness could solve sceptical challenges 
in metasemantics. In other words, he focuses on one particular application 
of his criterion of simplicity of theories. But the criterion of simplicity of 
theories, as stated by Williams, should be, in principle, applicable to any two 
competing theories. If we are be able to state defi nitions of competing theo-
ries in terms of fundamental properties, then we should be able to compare 
their lengths, i.e., to compare their simplicity in accordance with Williams’s 
criterion. However, the sole fact that it is “technically” possible to use the cri-
terion for any two theories does not automatically guarantee that such a use 
of the criterion can provide reliable results for any two theories. With regard 
to this, the aim of this paper can be seen as a discussion of possible problems 
that we might run into if the criterion of simplicity, as stated by Williams, is 
applied beyond the comparison of candidates for the best semantic theory.
Th ere are two reasons that justify a critical assessment of the criterion 
and its general applicability beyond semantics. Firstly, there is no reason to 
suppose that semantic theories should be treated diff erently than any other 
theories with regard to the comparison of their similarity. Th e second reason 
is that Williams’s proposal has a surprisingly wide reach with regard to the 
topics and problems related to simplicity of theories that are standardly 
discussed – and so it deserves at least some discussion from the perspective 
of philosophy of science. Even though the idea of grounding the notion of 
simplicity of theories in the notion of naturalness has been overlooked so 
far, I believe that it represents an interesting alternative to more traditional 
views on simplicity – despite its defi ciencies.
Based on which aspects of simplicity of theories are in question, discus-
sions within the philosophy of science can be roughly divided into three 
thematic areas:15
A) Firstly, philosophers discuss whether simplicity can serve as an indi-
cator of future success of a theory – and so it is a qualitative criterion – or if 
it is only an aesthetic criterion which says more about a subjective preference 
of scientists than about empirical plausibility of a theory.16
B) Secondly, philosophers discuss which aspects of theories we should 
compare with regard to their simplicity. Th is is an important point, because 
15  For a general overview see Hugo Keuzenkamp, Michael McAleer, and Arnold Zellner, “Th e 
Enigma of Simplicity,” in Simplicity, Inference and Modelling, eds. Arnold Zellner, Hugo 
Keuzenkamp, and Michael McAleer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1–10.
16 A  wider discussion of qualitative and aesthetic understanding of simplicity see James 
McAllister, “Th e Simplicity of Th eories: Its Degree and Form,” Journal for General Philosophy 
of Science 22, no. 1 (1991): 1–14.
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our decision infl uences the result of comparison. How simple a  theory is 
depends on which aspects of theories we assess. For example, we can focus, 
e.g., on ontological parsimony or syntactical complexity. Th eory A can end 
up simpler when compared with theory B according to one aspect (e.g., 
number of types of objects postulated), or more complicated according to 
another aspect (e.g., number of expressions needed to state a theory).
C) Th irdly, answering which aspects we should focus on does not au-
tomatically answer how simplicity of a theory should be measured. Let us 
say that we decide that syntactic complexity is a relevant parameter for the 
comparison of simplicity. Even if this is so, the fi nal result of measuring 
of syntactic complexity depends on how we decide to state a theory; which 
theoretical tools (what kind of terminology) we decide to employ in our 
linguistic representation of a  theory and which syntactic features of the 
linguistic representation of a theory we decide to count.17
Williams’s proposal could be used to resolve all three issues mentioned 
above. First of all, Williams’s proposal presents simplicity as a qualitative 
criterion. On the basis of Lewis’s views on naturalness of properties, a theory 
which scores better in the comparison of simplicity is also metaphysically 
privileged and so the comparison should grant better prospects of a theory.18
With regard to the second thematic area, naturalness of properties can also 
be used to settle which aspects of theories should be compared – namely 
the length of defi nitions of the clauses that a  theory consists of.19 And it 
also answers how simplicity should be measured – by counting the number 
of fundamental properties that takes part in those defi nitions. Th e most 
interesting part of Williams’s proposal is that it is able to maintain a syn-
tactical character of measuring simplicity and, at the same time, it is able 
to explain why the criterion of simplicity is a qualitative criterion. All those 
features make the Williams’s proposal for measuring simplicity of theories 
to be a rather interesting outline of a theory that might be generalized and 
further developed. However, as I will try to show in the rest of the paper, this 
17  In the same vein, in the discussions of evaluation of theories on the basis of Bayesian sta-
tistics and probability, Jeff ryes suggested that the number of adjustable parameters should 
be among relevant criteria for comparing simplicity. However, the number of adjustable pa-
rameters depends on how we decide to state a theory (what kind of equations we decide to use 
etc.). For a pioneering work on this topic see Harold Jeff reys, Th eory of Probability (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1961).
18  For a wider discussion of metaphysical privilege of natural properties see Sider, Writing the
Book.
19  And so it is a syntactical criterion.
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proposal for measuring simplicity of theories has also several constraints 
that might make it less appealing than it may seem at fi rst glance.
General Applicability
Th e fi rst constraint is related to the role that fundamental properties play in 
the criterion of simplicity. Simply put, the criterion of simplicity, as stated by 
Williams, cannot be used to decide the best candidate for the “fundamental” 
theory (i.e., the theory that specifi es fundamental properties). For Wil-
liam’s criterion of simplicity to work, it is necessary to specify fundamental 
properties fi rst. And the decision about the fundamental properties is the 
decision about the best “fundamental” theory. Th e fundamental theory is 
a  metaphysical theory that we adopt in order to specify which properties 
will be considered as fundamental.20 As in the case of all other theories, it is 
possible that there will be more candidates and some criterion for deciding 
between them must be adopted.
If the criterion of simplicity is used to decide the best candidate for 
the “fundamental” theory and the fundamental properties are defi ned 
by up-to-date physics, then the criterion will always affi  rm the position 
of an up-to-date physical theory when compared to other candidates. For 
example, suppose that someone proposes that mass, charge, and spin are 
not fundamental properties and she shows that the physical reality can be 
described in terms of some esoteric properties such as energetic vibrations. 
Th is esoteric theory is in no way a continuation of physics – it does not show 
that there is another layer of fundamental properties under the layer of mass, 
charge and spin, but it claims that physical reality needs to be studied from 
a  completely diff erent perspective. Suppose also that both theories fi t the 
data equally well and there is no diff erence in their predictive power. In the 
spirit of the criterion of simplicity, as proposed by Williams, we should com-
pare the lengths of defi nitions of both candidates for the best fundamental 
theory (an up-to-date physical theory and the esoteric theory) when defi ned 
in terms of fundamental properties. We have two options how to proceed. 
Firstly, we can state both defi nitions in terms of fundamental properties as 
proposed by up-to-date physics. Th is practically means that the defi nition of 
an up-to-date physical theory will be most probably the shortest one of all 
possible candidates because it is stated in terms of fundamental properties.
Such a comparison would always confi rm the superior position of an up-to-
20  I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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date physical theory, because no other theory can warrantedly score better 
than the one that is stated in terms of fundamental properties.
Secondly, we could compare the length of defi nitions of both theories 
when defi ned in terms of their own fundamental properties (in terms of 
up-to-date physical properties and esoteric properties respectively). Th is 
strategy may sound reasonable. Aft er all, Lewis accepted physical properties 
as fundamental because those were properties proposed by the best theory. 
If there is another candidate for the fundamental theory, then maybe we 
should reassess in terms of which properties we state defi nitions as well. 
However, the question of how we can compare two theories if they are de-
fi ned in terms of diff erent fundamental properties now arises.
Th e biggest advantage of Lewis’s proposal is that it states an objective 
criterion for measuring and comparing naturalness of properties because it 
settles a measure unit – all the defi nitions/theories eligible for comparison 
of naturalness/simplicity must be stated in terms of the same fundamen-
tal properties (mass, charge, and spin). Th e number of these fundamental 
properties in defi nitions is then what we count. If two theories are defi ned 
in terms of diff erent fundamental properties, then we need some rule for 
“unit conversion” to be able to reasonably compare the two theories. As far 
as I  know, there is no such rule for fundamental properties and I  do  not 
believe that it is possible to fi nd such a  rule at all. Any “unit conversion” 
for fundamental properties can be settled only with respect to the results 
of their mutual comparison, but this is exactly what we try to fi nd out. In 
other words, to fi nd out and compare the values of diff erent fundamental 
properties in defi nitions requires knowing how theories defi ned in diff er-
ent fundamental properties score in comparison of simplicity and this is 
something we do not know until we settle the value of diff erent fundamental 
properties. Simply said, we end up in a  vicious circle. Because of that, it 
is not possible to use the criterion of simplicity, as proposed by Williams, 
to determine the best candidate for the fundamental theory. Th e decision 
about the best candidate for the fundamental theory, i.e., the decision about 
which properties will be considered to be fundamental must be made with-
out relying on the criterion of simplicity – at least, if stated as it is discussed 
here.
Naturalness and Social Sciences
Th e fi rst constraint stated in the previous section aims at the possibility to 
use the criterion of simplicity, as stated by Williams, for a  comparison of 
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theories which aspire to settle fundamental properties. As I tried to show, 
the comparison is obstructed if fundamental properties are in question. Th e 
second constraint has even wider scope – I believe that it is doubtful whether 
the criterion of simplicity, as stated by Williams, can play any signifi cant 
role in the case of social sciences. As far as I can see, there are at least two 
reasons that might problematize the applicability of the criterion in social 
sciences.
Firstly, the applicability of Williams’s criterion of simplicity in social 
sciences depends on the success of reductionism. Basically, all the social 
sciences are interested in phenomena which are (more or less) dependent on 
behaviour of people. For example, results of an economic research in pur-
chasing power (very roughly) depend on willingness and ability of individu-
als to work (and pay for the work) and subsequently to spend money. Results 
of linguistic research depend on linguistic behaviour of some community 
of speakers, and so on. Th e criterion of simplicity can be used for a com-
parison of theories in social sciences only if someone shows how to state 
theories standardly engaged with phenomena related to human behaviour 
and cooperation in terms of fundamental properties. Th is is possible only if 
someone can show how social sciences can be “translated” into the language 
of physics without any loss.
Despite many attempts, the future prospect of concluding debates 
between reductionism and anti-reductionism looks poor. Debates on reduc-
tionism in social sciences are ongoing since seventies and each attempt to 
vindicate reductionism has been followed by a rival proposal that tried to 
undermine it. Such discussions can be found, e.g., in philosophy of mind. 
Any attempt to reduce mental states to neurological states of brain, e.g., 
Churchlands’ eliminativism,21 is counterbalanced with an attempt to show 
its defi ciencies22 and to vindicate anti-reductionism (see, e.g., Fodor’s23 and 
Putnam’s24 argument from multiple realization).
21  Patricia Churchland, Neurophilosophy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989); Paul Churchland,
Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988).
22  Th e most common arguments against eliminativism include self-refutation and the problem 
of qualia.
23 Jerry Fodor, “Special Sciences, or the Disunity of Science as a  Working Hypothesis,” 
Synthese 28, no. 2 (1974): 97–115; Jerry Fodor, “Special Sciences: Still Autonomous Aft er All 
Th ese Years,” Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1977): 149–63.
24  Hilary Putnam, “Th e Nature of Mental States,” in Mind Language and Reality: Philosophical 
Papers, Vol. 2, ed. Hilary Putnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 429–40.
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Similar discussions can be found in sociology. Wilson’s25 attempt to
build sociology on biological grounds has been immediately questioned by 
Sahlins26 and Lenski27 for omitting cultural infl uences and mechanisms as 
driving forces in shaping social aspects of our behaviour and in shaping the 
organization of human societies in general. Wilson’s idea that all aspects of 
human conduct can be explained in terms of biological determination was 
criticized especially with respect to explanations of particular sociological 
phenomena. Motivations and decisions of a  person in various social situ-
ations were sometimes rather forcibly explained as a  result of deep evolu-
tionary (or otherwise biological) mechanisms instead of relying on intuitive 
psychological explanations. While we can say that we have some ways how 
to reduce social sciences to biological theories (and subsequently to physics), 
it is not so clear that we will be able to provide a  full reduction without 
misrepresenting important aspects of social phenomena. In any case, even 
aft er fi ft y years of discussions, reductionism is far from providing conclusive 
evidence and reaching a general consensus.
Secondly, it is questionable whether the criterion of simplicity, as stated 
by Williams, should have any decisive role in social sciences. Th e idea that 
simpler theory is the one which is metaphysically more homogeneous is in 
the heart of Williams’s proposal. Th is is granted by the units of compari-
son – microphysical fundamental properties. More complicated theories 
“consist of” a bigger number of fundamental properties and because of that 
we can assume that they are also metaphysically less homogenous. Th e idea 
that the simplest theory must be also the most metaphysically homogenous 
one sounds quite reasonable when applied on sciences such as chemistry, as-
tronomy or geology.28 At the heart, objects of research of all those disciplines 
can be easily explained in terms of physical processes and so we can assume 
that more complicated candidate theories require also more complicated 
25  Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology: Th e New Synthesis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1975).
26 Marshall Sahlins, Th e Use and Abuse of Biology: An Anthropological Critique of Sociobiology
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977). See also Winch’s book for a more theoreti-
cal attempt to vindicate anti-reductionism and recent incarnations of his ideas: Peter Winch, 
Th e Idea of a  Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1958); Phil 
Hutchinson, Rupert Read, and Wes Sharrock, Th ere is No Such Th ing as a Social Science: In 
Defence of Peter Winch (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).
27  Gerhard Lenski, “Reviewed Work: Sociobiology: Th e New Synthesis. by Edward O. Wilson,” 
Social Forces 55, no. 2 (1976): 530–31.
28 With some provisos we could probably talk about natural sciences in general.
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explanations in terms of physics and therefore their defi nitions in terms of 
microphysical fundamental properties are also longer.
However, even if there is some way how to state theories within social 
sciences in terms of microphysical fundamental properties, the question why 
microphysical (metaphysical) homogeneity of those theories should have 
any impact on their soundness and subsequent acceptance needs further 
reasoning. Th is is not only the question of feasibility of Williams’s criterion 
of simplicity, but, even more importantly, it is the question of its legitimacy.
Th e biggest advantage of Williams’s criterion is that is off ers an objec-
tive procedure for measuring simplicity – in the sense that conditions under 
which we compare candidates are the same for all of them. But why should 
we expect that an economic theory which focuses on a development of the 
real estate market must be also simpler with regard to microphysical proper-
ties such as mass, charge, and spin? In other words, why should we expect 
that Williams’s criterion sets the right conditions for measuring simplicity 
of theories in social sciences?
Decisions of investors in real estate market are standardly resulting 
from a rational reconsideration of several aspects – including their income, 
the price of a  real estate and (very oft en) an interest rate on mortgage. In 
order to provide a working theory that would be able to track and predict 
a development of the real estate market, psychological and economical ex-
planations might be of a very good use. With respect to such explanations, 
the metaphysical homogeneity of a theory does not seem to be a reasonable 
decisive criterion. Th e fact that the expression “an interest rate on mortgage” 
can be defi ned in terms of xn microphysical fundamental properties does
not provide any substantial information related to a possible successfulness 
of a theory. Measuring simplicity of theories in social sciences in terms of 
metaphysical homogeneity means that we are applying measures that are 
not eff ectively engaged in determining the future prospect of those theo-
ries. With regard to this, the applicability of the criterion of simplicity, as 
proposed by Williams, beyond natural sciences seems to be questionable. 
Th is is not to say that simplicity should not play any role in social sciences at 
all. However, it might be more useful to look for criteria that may better fi t 
their object of study – similarly to natural sciences.29 Th e reason why micro-
physical properties are well-suited for natural sciences is that they provide 
a ground that is common for all of them. In a similar way, social sciences 
29 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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might look for something that they have in common – psychological or 
behavioural terminology could be a good fi rst guess.
Conclusion
 Th e aim of this paper is twofold. My partial aim was to show the connec-
tion between Lewis’s views on naturalness and the criterion of simplicity 
of theories, as proposed by Williams. Th e main aim of this paper was to 
show that the criterion of simplicity, if based on the notion of fundamental 
properties, has a limited applicability. As far as I can see, there are at least 
two constraints that prevent its general applicability to a  comparison of 
simplicity of theories. Th e fi rst constraint is that the criterion of simplicity is 
not able to determine the best candidate for a “fundamental” theory (i.e., the 
theory that determines fundamental properties). Th e second constraint is 
that while the acceptance of the criterion of simplicity based on the notion of 
fundamental properties sounds reasonable in the case of natural sciences, it 
is doubtful whether it is legitimately applicable in the case of social sciences. 
With regard to the objects of research in social sciences, there is not much 
reason to suppose that microphysical homogeneity of those theories should 
have any impact on their soundness and acceptance. Two questions now 
arise: a) whether we should use the criterion as stated by Williams and b) 
whether there is no better way how to measure simplicity of theories within 
social sciences.
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